interessante analyse van Citigroup over de redenen waarom goud wel (pros) en niet (cons) zou moeten stijgen; uiteindelijk verwachten ze goud "to ratchet much, much higher over time":
PROS:
➤ Geopolitics. The nuclear standoff in Iran, conflict in Iraq, the leftward lurch in Latin
America, and political fragmentation in the US and EU are likely if lamentably sufficient to maintain an undercurrent of safe-haven demand.
➤ Long-term economic imbalances. Citigroup economists remain concerned over intractable imbalances in trade, investment, currencies, interest rates, and debt. They expect the US trade deficit to expand to a record 6.8% of GDP in 2006, and for a renewed trend of dollar weakening due to central bank reserve re-balancing, and interest
rate differentials drawing investment flows away from the US. Gold responds to financial stress, and it is unlikely that these imbalances will be resolved without dislocation.
➤ Investment demand driving gold, but tiny in dollar terms. The recent gold rally has been almost entirely driven by investment demand, as fabrication fell 18.3% YoY in 4Q/05 due to price elasticity effects. Net investment in physical gold was $11 bln worldwide in 2005, a rounding error compared to equity or fixed income markets.
➤ Central Bank sales likely to undershoot, accumulation possible. Central bank sales
appear to be tracking well shy of 2005’s torrid 663 T pace. Switzerland has finished its
program. The ECB has indicated that it is finished for the year. Quotas as shifting to France and Germany, where legislative roadblocks remain formidable. At the same time, offsetting accumulation is possible among Asian and Middle Eastern central banks.
➤ Support from other commodities. Gold has benefited from asset allocation-driven
investment inflows into metals and energy. While $600/oz is impressive, gold has actually underperformed copper, nickel, and zinc which have increased 150-307% since early 2003, minor metals such as molybdenum which have increased 5-10x, and even select grades of coal and steel. In real dollar terms, gold in 2005 was well shy of 1995
levels.
➤ Pent-up physical demand should buffer the downside. On a defensive note, we believe gold will prove resistant to any catastrophic selloff, due to pent-up physical demand in price-sensitive Asian markets. Fabricators are more sensitive to price volatility rather than absolute levels, while patterns in scrap and retail suggest that
physical buyers, so much in evidence in 1H/05, will re-enter the market on price dips.
CONS:
➤ Interest rates raise gold opportunity cost. Higher real interest rates have traditionally
posed headwinds for gold, by raising the opportunity cost of holding a non interestbearing
asset. Of course the key question is real, rather than nominal, rates – begging questions about the relevance of “core” inflation figures and consumer versus asset inflation. Our sense is that the drivers of interest rates and slope of the yield curve are more important than nominal levels.
➤ Fabrication collapse is unhealthy. With fabrication contracting 18.3% YoY in 4Q/05,
and indications that it has fallen further in 1Q/06, the gold market is becoming extended,
one-dimensional, and potentially vulnerable to vicious corrections. Fabrication demand
is typically 4-6x investment demand, with jewelry accounting for roughly 76% of the total. GFMS believes that jewelry could fall as low as 2,200 T, a level last seen in 1990. We believe it is important for the gold price to pause for a period of months, to allow fabrication to re-equilibrate and come back into the market.
➤ Scrap surge. Scrap flows accelerated dramatically with the gold price in late 2005, with
the fourth quarter seeing 30% of the year’s total, and most of that in December. This contrasts with the pattern of declining price elasticity of secondary supply seen in recent years as most of the “near-market” scrap had seemingly been flushed out. Scrap is one of the most important lines in the supply/demand model, as it can vary by 400 T/year and is extremely price-sensitive with virtually no lead time. Indications are that rapid scrap flows have continued into 2006.
➤ De-hedging wanes. Mining company de-hedging has the effect of draining liquidity from the gold market, and has been an important source of support for gold over the past five years. In 2005, de-hedging eased to 131 T from 2004 highs of 427 T. GFMS expects de-hedging to re-accelerate somewhat in 2006. The risk is that if both dehedging and investment demand wane, there could be 200 – 300 TPY “excess” gold in the market. We do not expect this to transpire.